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INTRODUCTION
Cardiovascular health care professionals (HCPs) bear a
heavy professional responsibility. Indeed, the profession
itself is defined by the commitment to place the well-being
of the patient ahead of the self-interest of the professional.
An obligation of professional behavior of cardiovascular
HCPs is to encourage the development of new knowledge
that can ultimately improve patient care. One way to
accomplish this is by participation in clinical research, which
involves a complex interaction of multiple parties (including
individuals, institutions, commercial organizations, and reg-
ulatory agencies). Because cardiovascular disease is the
leading cause of death and disability in the technologically
developed world (1) and is projected to increase in preva-
lence over the next 30 years, appropriate ethical behavior by
cardiovascular HCPs could have a major impact on the
well-being of both individuals and society. Lack of appro-
priate participation in efforts to improve care could under-
mine the delicate balance in the clinical research system (2),
which ensures the protection of human subjects and forms
the basis for the evidence upon which rational clinical
practice is based.
Clinical research studies encompass a broad array of
activities, ranging from reviews of medical records to small
Phase I safety studies to large multicenter clinical trials. The
roles and responsibilities of parties to this complex endeavor
have not reached a level of complete clarity. For example,
the first textbook on the function of data-monitoring
committees was just published in the past two years (3).
Accordingly, any effort currently to define appropriate
behavior of individual investigators must be viewed as a
“moving target.”
The most easily identifiable situation in which profes-
sional behavior is called into question occurs when the
cardiovascular HCP interacts with the industry that invents,
manufactures, and sells medical products. The enormous
magnitude of the clinical research enterprise and the high
financial stakes of transactions between cardiovascular
HCPs and the industry provide fertile ground for sensa-
tional claims and concerns. Indeed, as technology continues
to advance at a rapid pace, the interdependence of cardio-
vascular HCPs and the medical products industry is increas-
ingly evident. The advances of drugs and devices for
diagnostic and therapeutic purposes have been an over-
whelmingly positive development for society, but the large
impact of technology on health outcomes and cost rein-
forces the importance of professional conduct in the devel-
opment and assessment of these new products.
Although the majority of cardiovascular clinical research
is funded by the industry, a significant minority is funded
from public sources, most notably the National Heart,
Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI), a division of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH). However, the NHLBI
and the NIH as a whole are encouraging public-private
partnerships for clinical research (www.nihroadmap.nih.
gov), in which resources from both sectors are combined to
cover the enormous cost of technology development and
evaluation. The principles of appropriate investigator par-
ticipation are applicable across the range of funding sources,
including industry, public sources, and public-private part-
nerships.
For the most part, the medical products industry and
cardiovascular HCPs are aligned in a professional manner.
Both aim to develop and use technology that will diagnose
cardiovascular disease more accurately, treat it when it is
present, and prevent its development in people at risk.
However, significant tension and/or conflict of interest may
occur in the development and evaluation of medical tech-
nology by cardiovascular HCPs. Society rightfully expects
that, in evaluating medical products and technology, the
cardiovascular HCP will act in a professional manner and
place the well-being of patients ahead of his or her personal
interests. The industry has given attention to the issue of its
interaction with HCPs, and the Advanced Medical Tech-
nology Association (AdvaMed) has published a code of
ethics on interaction with HCPs that became effective in
January 2004 (4).
TYPES OF CONFLICT
Conflict of interest in relation to industry is not a mono-
lithic issue. Rather, there are varying levels of conflict,
requiring different remedies to ensure that the public trust is
being kept. One consideration is whether the conflict relates
to an individual cardiovascular specialist or to an institution
as a whole. A second consideration is the intensity of the
conflict.
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Individual conflict. Conflict of interest may begin with an
idea for research, regardless of the source of funding. Those
who design clinical trials and observational studies almost
always have bias in terms of which theories they favor or
upon which they may have staked their professional repu-
tations. Accordingly, when considering the relationship
between industry and the profession, one should not dismiss
non-financial sources of bias and conflict, but should con-
sider the whole spectrum of conflict. In fact, in general the
degree of conflict for an individual may have several aspects
as described in the Task Force 1 report and in the following
text.
When a physician enrolls patients into clinical studies, a
number of individual issues may arise, including questions
of financial and personal professional gain. Because research
is paid for by a public or private sponsor, the potential
financial conflict is obvious to almost everyone involved.
Fundamentally, the question is: how can the investigator
maintain independence of thought and action from the
sponsor in the conduct and evaluation of the research? The
endorsement of the concepts involved in a study can lead to
bias in how research is conducted and interpreted. However,
the major issue in industry-sponsored research, as discussed
in the following text, is the relationship between payment
and the results of the study. Of equal concern, given the
intense pressure on individual HCPs to create a revenue
stream through efficient procedure-oriented practice, pa-
tients may not be offered the opportunity to participate in
clinical research studies because it would reduce the income
of the HCP or the practice. This could occur because a
revenue-generating procedure might not be performed or
because the time spent obtaining consent is compensated at
a lower rate than direct clinical activity.
Institutional conflict. Until recently, little attention had
been paid to institutional conflict of interest. However,
recent difficulties with a particular research project—the
Gelsinger case (5)—led to a major report by the Association
of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) (6) stressing the
difficulties when an institution has equity or other major
financial interest in the outcome of a study. When an
institution stands to benefit in reputation or finance from a
research study, a potential conflict exists. Conversely, an
institution can discourage investigation when it interferes
with normal operation at the hospital. Additionally, clinical
investigators are frequently under intense pressure to gen-
erate revenue to support the salaries of research nurses
because of lack of reserve funds in institutions and practices
to cover those salaries during periods of slow enrollment.
Universities, medical centers, and professional organiza-
tions have significant financial entanglements with the
industry that go well beyond the conduct of research. The
majority of continuing medical education (CME) is funded
by industry, and significant donations and funding of
training and faculty positions are awarded to academic
institutions by industry. Both the American College of
Cardiology Foundation (ACCF) and the American Heart
Association (AHA) rely on industry funding in the form of
direct support, training money, and exhibits at national
meetings (7) (see the Task Force 6 report).
LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY
AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT
Individual clinicians play a variety of roles in the develop-
ment and assessment of cardiovascular technology, and
these roles may be considered according to the degree to
which the clinician is financially involved with the sponsor
of the research. At the most basic level, when the industry
needs to conduct human research, it must contract with a
physician-investigator to perform the research. The inves-
tigator, in turn, has a dual responsibility: the primary
responsibility is to the research subjects to ensure that the
research conforms to the ethical standards defined in doc-
uments such as the Declaration of Helsinki (8), the Geneva
Declaration (9), and the Belmont Report (10). These
obligations are spelled out in the informed-consent docu-
ment, which is a contract between the investigator and the
subject or patient. The second responsibility of the investi-
gator is to complete the research in a professional manner.
These issues are detailed in the regulatory document from
the Food and Drug Administration entitled “Good Clinical
Practices” (11,12). The contract between the investigator
and the sponsor provides evidence of the seriousness of this
obligation. Therefore, cardiovascular HCPs who enroll
patients in clinical research studies have a potential conflict
because they are paid to conduct the research, but society
has also assigned investigators an independent role to act on
behalf of the human subject in the conduct of the research.
A researcher may also be involved in disseminating the
research findings. Because most CME is paid for by the
medical products industry, interactions with industry are
common, both in the writing of manuscripts for the peer-
reviewed literature and in the preparation and delivery of
lecture materials, slide sets, and other CME materials.
Although the dissemination of research findings is increas-
ingly recognized as a responsibility of the clinicians partic-
ipating in research (13), as discussed in the Task Force 1
report, the degree to which the payment for these activities
biases the control of the content of the material represents a
potential conflict in this situation, and adherence to stan-
dards of conduct in CME is essential (see the Task Force 3
report).
The industry depends heavily on consultants from the
academic and practice communities. These consultants offer
insight into clinical and scientific issues and often provide
feedback on dissemination of ideas and technology into the
community. Consultancy contracts can vary considerably, as
can the financial transactions around consulting.
A significant number of cardiovascular HCPs become
inventors of technology. This privileged position is a major
source of societal interest and concern. Much of the ad-
vancement of cardiovascular medicine in the U.S. has been
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driven by ingenious inventor-investigators who were able to
combine scientific and engineering insights with knowledge
of cardiovascular medicine (14). A cardiovascular specialist
with a patented invention that could result in substantial
financial and status benefits and who uses that invention to
perform procedures or studies on patients perhaps repre-
sents the highest level of direct conflict. It is recognized that
the participation of the clinician-inventor in the clinical trial
can be valuable. However, the clinician-inventor should not
be the principal investigator of the clinical trial. Further-
more, special oversight is necessary when the clinician-
inventor is involved in the informed-consent process (15).
Finally, a growing number of cardiovascular HCPs work
directly in the medical products industry. This may lead to
multiple issues of conflict of interest, particularly in conduct
of clinical research developing or evaluating medical prod-
ucts. Such individuals may be involved but should not be the
principal investigator of a study.
COMMON ISSUES
Declaration of conflict. When an individual or institution
works with the medical products industry, society agrees
that disclosure is a minimal standard. Although the issues in
CME are discussed in the Task Force 3 report, less energy
has been placed on appropriate declarations by investigators
enrolling patients in clinical research studies. Recently, the
AAMC (6,16,17) guidelines have emphasized disclosure to
the patient when the investigator or the institution has
equity interest or the potential for royalties in the product
being evaluated (6,18). The degree to which these guide-
lines are being followed has not been quantified. More data
needs to be collected in order to evaluate this type of
disclosure. At minimum, financial interests must be dis-
closed to the Institutional Review Board (IRB).
Publication. The conduct of clinical research obligatorily
involves an agreement between a subject (often a patient)
and an investigator that the study is being done “to create
generalizable knowledge.” This term has become standard
in the definition of clinical research under which institu-
tional ethics committees review and approve protocols
under federal guidelines (18). However, the literature is
replete with flaws in the approach to creating this body of
knowledge. A critical report by Dickersin (19) highlights
the degree to which failure to publish results can lead to
inaccurate assessments of the balance of risk and benefit of
diagnostic and therapeutic technologies. A particularly in-
teresting report from the Johns Hopkins and Oxford uni-
versities (20) documented, in a review of all protocols
submitted to institutional IRBs in the 1980s, that industry
funding of research is an independent and major predictor
of failure to publish. Recent publications have emphasized
that this problem has not gone away (21–23), and multiple
journals and investigators have called for a registry of all
clinical trials (24).
Beyond the failure to publish is the issue of determination
of the editorial content of publications. The content may be
heavily influenced by the commercial sponsor in several
ways in addition to simply not releasing the data. The
sponsor may control the analysis for, or the writing of, the
research publication, or may pressure investigators to por-
tray a particular point of view.
A recent trend in the medical products industry is the
assignment of publications managers to product develop-
ment teams. These managers often are company employees,
but increasingly major “medical education” firms are com-
bining CME, project promotion, and the production of
scientific articles for peer review into package contracts.
This effort may lead to “ghost writing,” in which the
publications group manager writes the manuscript while the
investigators are listed as the authors. This practice seems
commonplace in the production of journal supplements,
which are highly valuable to industry because the law allows
sales representatives to distribute publications from peer-
reviewed journals. In this manner, an investigator can write
about an off-label use of a product, and although the
company cannot advertise that indication, it can distribute
the supplement to practitioners. Perhaps of more concern is
the use of names of prominent key opinion leaders on major
reports from clinical research without independent input or
editorial control from these investigators. There should be
formal disclosure in the manuscript, if the manuscript is
written, in whole or in part, by an individual or group other
than the listed authors. All publication supplements should
name the sponsor, anyone other than the listed authors
involved in preparing the supplement, and whether or not it
was peer-reviewed.
An additional issue is access to data. In most industry-
funded research, the investigators are restricted from per-
forming their own analyses. The industry sponsor either
directly provides statistical support or contracts with a
contract research organization for the purpose of analysis for
regulatory and publication purposes. The industry contends
that access to printouts of the analyses is sufficient to ensure
that investigators have independent access to the data
(Bayh-Dole Act of 1980; P.L. 96-517). Others have argued
that the conduct of the analyses themselves should be in the
purview of statisticians and clinicians free of high-level
financial ties with the sponsor (25). Finally, the industry can
apply significant pressure to investigators who wish to
continue to do research with that company to shade reports
favorably for the sponsor. The degree to which this happens
has not been assessed, although some highly publicized
cases have brought the issue to public attention (15,26,27).
These potential problems must be balanced with the
legitimate concerns of industry. Many investigators have
neither the capacity to manage complex datasets nor the
knowledge of biostatistics to do their own analyses. Without
the stimulus of industry support, and at times ghost writing,
important research results can languish for months to years
because of time constraints on academic investigators or lack
of motivation and interest. Additionally, unmonitored ac-
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cess to data from a study can allow the data to end up in the
hands of individuals without either the in-depth knowledge
of the topic or the skills to perform appropriate analyses.
Optimally, the database should be shared by both the
sponsor and the committee responsible for publication (see
the following text).
PROPOSED APPROACHES
Accordingly, we advocate the following set of principles to
allay the concerns of both cardiovascular specialty investi-
gators and the medical products industry:
● The primary results of human subjects’ research must be
made public. Surveys or analyses conducted for quality
assurance purposes are not intended to be included.
When the findings have insufficient priority for publica-
tion in the peer-reviewed literature, other means of
disseminating knowledge should be used, such as
through professional meetings, publicly available ar-
chives, web sites, or online tutorials. It is acknowledged
that the mechanisms for public disclosure are not yet
standardized, but the principle is that the default posi-
tion in human investigation is that the results of the
study should be made public so that they can contribute
to generalizable knowledge.
● The publication must adhere to the principles regarding
authorship, conflict of interest, and publication ethics as
expressed in the International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors’ “Uniform Requirements” (28).
● A committee responsible for publication should be
constituted as part of the contract encompassing multi-
site human research studies. All decisions regarding
development, authorship, and submission of any manu-
script, abstract, or other presentation arising from the
study should be made by the committee responsible for
publication. Such a committee should be comprised of
investigators participating in the study who are scientific
and medical experts in their respective fields. It is
appropriate to include representatives from the sponsor
as full voting members of the committee. The committee
responsible for publication should act as an independent
body to fulfill the professional obligation to subjects
participating in the research by representing their inter-
ests and by serving the professional mission of develop-
ing, improving, and disseminating scientific and medical
knowledge. In small studies, this committee may consist
of only a few people involved in the study. In larger
studies that could inform clinical practice or better define
important mechanisms of disease, such a committee
should be carefully constructed as a critical component of
the trial’s organization.
● The committee responsible for publication should review
and approve all analyses and publication topics proposed
by participating investigators and institutions, whether
based upon the data collected by all participating insti-
tutions, by a subset of the participating institutions, or by
only a single participating institution.
● The committee responsible for publication should review
and constructively critique all proposed submissions that
result from an approved analysis or publication topic,
and should consider their scientific merit with the aim of
promoting the dissemination of scientific and medical
knowledge. This should be done in a timely manner
before submission for presentation or publication.
● The industry sponsor should ensure that the study data
are available for any analysis or publication topic ap-
proved by the committee responsible for publication, and
the resulting manuscript or presentation should be sent
to the sponsor for its timely review and comment. There
should be no restrictions on the topics or analytical
approaches used in developing manuscripts and presen-
tations. Both the industry sponsor and the investigators
should be free to suggest topics and analyses for consid-
eration by the publications committee.
● When the research sponsor chooses to submit publica-
tions independent of the committee responsible for
publications, the Trial Steering Committee should de-
velop procedures for acknowledgment and disclosure of
the publication’s relationship to the study.
● In the case of multicenter studies, the first publication of
the results of the study should be a multicenter publica-
tion reflecting the results of the study as a whole as
specified in the protocol and/or statistical analysis plan.
● The author(s) of the initial and subsequent multicenter
publication(s), as approved by the committee responsible
for publication, should have access to all of the data from
the study and should have the ability to analyze those
data, independent of the sponsor, although this principle
is subject to review of the capability of the authors to
perform appropriate analyses. In the case that the inves-
tigators are not capable of independent analysis, it is
preferable for a statistician independent of the sponsor to
be contracted to either perform the analyses or to check
the analyses of the sponsor. This statistician should have
a copy of the database.
● The initial multicenter publication should be published
as soon as practicable after completion of the study, and
the committee responsible for publication should at-
tempt to have the first manuscript submitted to a
reputable, peer-reviewed biomedical journal within a
reasonable period of time (not more than one year) from
the end of the study.
● The committee responsible for publication should
promptly provide a copy of a planned submission to the
Steering Committee for timely review by that committee
and the sponsor within a reasonable period of time.
● The committee responsible for publication should review
the documents, including any comments from the Steer-
ing Committee and sponsor. If confidential information
would be released inappropriately in the manuscript or
other presentation, it should be removed if possible, or
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the sponsor should be given appropriate time to protect
intellectual property. However, information that the
committee responsible for publication finds to be neces-
sary for the accurate presentation and interpretation of
the study results, or which is required by the publishing
journal to enable other researchers to reproduce those
results, should not be withheld beyond this reasonable
period of time (typically 90 days).
● In the conduct of industry-funded clinical research, there
is a possibility of the discovery of new findings that could
be classified as intellectual property. Typically, the spon-
sor will desire to claim all intellectual property derived
from the research. This stance is understandable given
that the industry is paying for the research and requires
patent protection to enable the investment in research to
recoup profits for its employees and investors. However,
after a reasonable period of time has elapsed to protect
intellectual property, the intellectual property issue
should not be used to limit the publication of results.
Although formal review of a manuscript by the sponsor
is typically provided in the contract for clinical trials,
such review should not unduly delay the dissemination
of key trial findings.
● The support of the sponsor must be recognized in any
publication or presentation arising from the research or
the study. If representatives of the sponsor make sub-
stantive contributions to the intellectual content of the
manuscript or other presentation, as described in the
“Uniform Requirements,” they should be invited to serve
as co-authors of the manuscript or other presentation.
Acceptance of this invitation should be at the discretion
of the representative.
CONFIDENTIALITY
In general, investigators are required to maintain confiden-
tiality with regard to knowledge about the product being
evaluated when clinical research is conducted with industry.
Given the competitive research environment, this stipula-
tion is quite understandable. Disagreements arise, however,
about the scope of confidentiality and the duration of the
agreement.
Increasingly, industry has considered confidentiality not
only to include intellectual property about the drug or
device, but also know-how related to the drug or device and
even the protocol itself. This approach has led to extensive
delays in the conduct of clinical research because of the
requirement to review and sign confidentiality agreements
before protocols can be reviewed. Such an approach also
inhibits one’s ability to discuss a protocol’s merits and
feasibility among professional colleagues. In general, confi-
dentiality about the drug or device seems reasonable, but
clinical know-how may belong to the investigator. Protocols
should be considered non-confidential at the point at which
they are dispersed to principal investigators at the sites,
because broad discussion in the clinical community is
required to determine whether the research study is appro-
priate for the local environment.
Few people in our society are capable of maintaining
confidentiality for a lifetime. Accordingly, a time limit is
typically placed on the duration of confidentiality. Although
there is no objective standard or empirical base on which to
make a judgment, confidentiality (except regarding study
results—see the following text) should be limited to five
years or until the end of the study, whichever is longer.
INDEMNIFICATION
Clinical research is no more immune from our societal
preoccupation with lawsuits than is any other area of
medicine. Indeed, injury occurring to human subjects has
become an increasing source of concern and a topic of
increasing interest by the legal profession. In general, the
sponsor of the research should hold the investigator harm-
less for injury complications resulting from conduct of the
study in accordance with the protocol. Obviously, the
sponsor should not be responsible for negligence in the
conduct of the protocol by the investigator.
COMPENSATION
Clinical research is a complex and demanding endeavor.
Accordingly, payment for involvement in many aspects of
clinical research activities is reasonable and should be
expected. The question arises, however, concerning what
should constitute reasonable professional standards for pay-
ment. Consulting may occur at several points during med-
ical product development and interpretation of data:
● During the early phases of product development, con-
siderable effort is required to guide decision making on
the design of the molecule or device and in the design of
animal and human studies. As the human studies are
conducted, expert advice often is needed for interpreta-
tion of the data.
● In the later phases, product acceptance and message
acceptance research is commonly done by marketing
groups. Individual investigators should be careful to
segregate consulting, marketing efforts, and CME into
different categories with different purposes (see the Task
Force 3 report).
● Conflict can arise at several levels as a result of consult-
ing. When a cardiovascular HCP cares for an individual
patient, decisions on product selection are made every
day. It is critical to the public trust that neither patient
nor product selection be based on payments occurring
for the conduct of clinical research.
At a broader level, key opinion leaders can be identified at
local, regional, national, and international levels. These
individuals are highly valuable to industry because their
opinions have a wide impact on prescribing and product-use
decisions by other physicians. A complex issue arises when
considering payments for lectures and other CME efforts
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(see the Task Force 3 report). This becomes particularly
important for key opinion leaders who also serve on profes-
sional society committees that devise clinical practice guide-
lines and performance measures (see the Task Force 6
report). The level of compensation should be commensurate
with the work performed.
THE INVENTOR-INVESTIGATOR DILEMMA
The investment of the NIH in biomedical research has
spawned a large number of investigators who make discov-
eries that may have beneficial applications to human health.
The Bayh-Dole Act (29) instructs academic medical centers
to support the transformation of these ideas into commer-
cial reality. Similarly, particularly in the device world,
physician entrepreneurs have invented new approaches to
technology, leading to “start-up” companies.
Recent events in the arena of gene therapy have high-
lighted the special nature of this situation. In the highly
publicized case of Jesse Gelsinger, a research subject with a
genetic deficiency (30), the University of Pennsylvania
allegedly had supported the commercialization of an ap-
proach to gene therapy delivery. The faculty member was
the principal inventor, allegedly with major equity in the
commercial entity, and the university also allegedly held
major equity. In addition, the experimental material appar-
ently was manufactured at the university. When Jesse, an
18-year-old reasonably healthy boy, died as a direct result of
the experimental therapy, the lawyers for the family argued
that the process of consent and adverse-event reporting was
flawed, and that neither the investigator nor the institution
could be unbiased about the human experiment being
performed.
Avoiding inventor-investigator conflict of interest. Ide-
ally, invention and investigation of new discoveries should
maintain rigorous barriers to avoid both the appearance of
and the opportunity for bias (see the Task Force 1 report).
Typically, this requires physician-scientists to allow other
investigators to perform the human testing of their inven-
tions. Although difficult for some inventors, this approach is
the only reliable means to protect both the patient and the
scientific integrity of the research. It is often simply too
difficult to maintain rigorous standards for evidence-based
research for drugs or devices in situations in which an
involved inventor stands to profit substantially from the
success of the project. Even when the scientific integrity of
the investigation is impeccable, other physician-scientists,
the public, regulators, and the press are likely to question the
independence and reliability of the research. In this situa-
tion, fairly strict separation of the inventor is most often the
best policy. One exception may occur when the inventor is
the best or only person with the skill to operate the device
in experimental circumstances involving humans (15,25). In
this circumstance, special precautions must be taken to
independently verify that subjects are fully informed about
the issues involved in their participation. As soon as others
become facile with the device, the inventor-investigator
should be removed from experimental subject contact (26).
AVOIDING BIAS IN REPORTING CLINICAL TRIALS
In recent years, disturbing cases have surfaced in which
physician-scientists played a passive or active role in pub-
lishing scientific results of clinical trials in which it was
claimed major distortion of the findings had occurred (26).
These issues may involve selective reporting of results in
which findings with unfavorable impact on a commercial
drug or device were withheld. Such episodes have a devas-
tating effect on the acceptance of clinical trial results,
bringing them all under close scrutiny. Several critical
principles should govern the analysis and reporting of all
clinical trials:
● The physician-investigator should be critically involved
in the design of the trial and selection of the efficacy
measures.
● A completely passive role, in which the sponsor designs
the trial and the physician is “offered” a role as Study
Chair or member of the Steering Committee, is unac-
ceptable; such roles may be acceptable if significant input
into final study design and conduct occurs.
● The Study Chair and Steering Committee should be
signatories to the protocol and to a formal statistical
analysis plan (SAP). Studies should be monitored for
safety independent of both the sponsor and the investi-
gators (31).
● In reporting results, the investigators should be guided
by the SAP and should disclose any analyses that deviate
from this plan.
● The editors of the publishing journal should be supplied
with the SAP at the time of submission for publication.
● Full disclosure of negative results is imperative. In the
case of an entirely negative study, posting on a public
web site may be necessary owing to the well-publicized
negative reporting bias of medical journals (see the
preceding text). When the primary end point of a study
is negative but secondary end points seem to be positive,
it is critical to emphasize the negative result before
discussing the implications of secondary analyses.
● Delay in reporting results that are unfavorable to a drug
or device is equally problematic. Such delays may result
in reduced quality of care for individual patients, or may
lead to another sponsor conducting a similar trial thereby
exposing other patients to unneeded risks.
ETHICAL ISSUES IN TRIAL DESIGN:
ADEQUATE STATISTICAL POWER
The purpose of the study design should be clear, and it
should be able to answer the question being addressed. In
this regard, there are appropriate times for pure superiority
trials, for non-inferiority trials, and for combined
superiority/non-inferiority trials. The key issue is that the
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trial design and sample size should be adequate for the
stated purpose.
There are conflicting views in the clinical trial community
regarding the ethical considerations in deciding the sample
size for a trial. Some authorities believe that a deliberately
underpowered trial, particularly when the goal of the trial is
to demonstrate “non-inferiority,” is inherently unethical.
These arguments center on the principle that all trials
involve known and unknown risks to the subject. Accord-
ingly, it is appropriate to expose patients to such risks only
when the results are likely to provide significant incremental
medical knowledge. According to some, an underpowered
“non-inferiority” trial cannot benefit medical science, there-
fore intrinsically constituting an unacceptable risk to the
patient. Opponents of this point of view argue that all trials
have the potential to result in unanticipated scientific
discoveries, and that an underpowered trial may eventually
be included in a useful meta-analysis. Accordingly, this
problem represents a “gray zone” in clinical trial ethics in
which there is no universal agreement. Non-inferiority trials
have a place in medicine, but underpowered non-inferiority
trials have questionable value.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The interaction between cardiovascular HCPs and the
medical products industry in the setting of clinical research
is complex and evolving. The principles of disclosure are
critical. However, continued evaluation, empirical study,
and publication of studies examining the “rules of engage-
ment” in clinical research are needed to enable the profes-
sion to maintain appropriate independence while participat-
ing in a partnership with industry to develop new diagnostic
and therapeutic technologies and to assess older ones.
Critical principles to be considered by individual investiga-
tors are as follows:
● Encouragement for the development of new knowledge
is a professional responsibility of cardiovascular HCPs.
● The investigator enrolling patients has an obligation to
conduct the study according to the protocol, but also has
a legal and ethical responsibility to the human subject
from whom consent has been obtained. Thus, although
the investigator is obligated to the sponsor he or she has
a superseding obligation to act independently from the
sponsor if necessary on behalf of the subject.
● Results of human studies must be made public regardless
of their outcome. This responsibility can be accom-
plished preferentially by publication in a peer-reviewed
journal, but it may require posting on a public web site
or other means of public access.
● In multicenter studies, a formal mechanism for a com-
mittee to oversee publication and publish the results
should be established by contract before the start of the
study. This committee should prevent control of the
process either by the sponsor or by individual investiga-
tors and should prevent “renegade” publication without
due consideration of the interest of the many people who
must work together to conduct a clinical research study.
● The complex endeavor of multicenter studies continues
to evolve so that standards of conduct and appropriate
behavior by all parties will become optimized with
continued discussion. Research on methods of perform-
ing clinical research and public discussion of the findings
of that research should be a high priority for all partic-
ipants, especially HCPs such as ACCF and AHA
members.
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BACKGROUND
Physicians, scientists, patients, and the public rely on
professional organizations to provide an independent, un-
biased forum for presentation of research, publications, and
educational activities at their scientific sessions and in
scientific publications. Attendees at educational activities
sponsored by not-for-profit organizations usually incur fi-
nancial and other costs. The attendees expect to gain
information from leading experts that may modify their
behavior and result in a change in patient care. Concerns
about real or perceived conflicts of interest among organi-
zations, physicians, scientists, patients, and educators re-
garding their relationships with the medical products indus-
try have been debated in the press and in medical journals
(1,2). Concerns about these relationships have been dis-
cussed extensively by the Association of American Medical
Colleges (AAMC), which issued guidelines for conflict of
interest in human subjects’ research based on a consensus of
a committee including clinicians, scientists, legislators, eth-
icists, consumers, and representatives from commercial in-
terests (3).
The Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Ed-
ucation (ACCME), which accredits continuing medical
education (CME) provider organizations, currently requires
full disclosure of pertinent commercial relationships. The
ACCME has revised the Standards for Commercial Sup-
port which were adopted on April 1, 2004. Both the
American College of Cardiology Foundation (ACCF) and
the American Heart Association (AHA) policies must be in
compliance to maintain their accreditation (Table 1).
“Disclosure” must never include the use of a trade name
or a product-group message. A provider must disclose this
information to learners before beginning the educational
activity. The ACCME standards allow for relationships to
be disclosed verbally, and for a representative of the CME
provider who was in attendance to attest in writing that
verbal disclosure did occur.
Medical societies have struggled to define a significant
financial relationship that poses a real or perceived conflict
of interest. The American Society of Clinical Oncology
recently amended its regulations to encompass any money
exceeding $100 an investigator received from a firm funding
a trial (5). One criticism of this regulation is that the
threshold for disclosure is so low that the large number of
disclosures might obscure more serious financial relation-
ships. The New England Journal of Medicine has maintained
that authors of reviews and editorials must not have any
financial interest in a company or its competitor that makes
a product discussed in the article. Journal editors relaxed the
policy for reviewers in June 2002 because their ability to
recruit individuals for review articles and editorials was
constrained (6). The new policy prohibits a “significant”
financial interest, which the journal defined as a lower limit
of $10,000 in accordance with guidelines developed by the
National Institutes of Health (7) and the AAMC (3).
The concerns of consumers and professional organiza-
tions over conflicts of interest in medical research challenge
the ACCF and the AHA to review their policies on conflict
of interest, acknowledgment of commercial support, and
disclosure of financial relationships with the medical prod-
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